# LETTER

TO

## Mr DODWELL;

Wherein all the Arguments in his Epistolary Discourse against the Immortality of the SOUL are particularly answered, and the Judgment of the Fathers concerning that Matter truly represented.

By Samuel Clarke, M. A. Chaplain to the Right Reverend Father in God JOHN, Lord Bishop of Norwich.

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## ERRATUM.

Pag. 93. Line penult. read, Eruditionis.

#### A

# LETTER

TO

Mr DODWELL, &c.

SIR,

when Men of great reputation in the World for Learning, in their Discourses upon the most important Doctrines of Religion, rashly and upon very little grounds, allow themselves to advance hew and crude Notions, and extravagant Hypotheses; which the Profane will not, and the Weak are not able to separate, from the principal and fundamental and most necessary Doctrines themselves.

For, as in Natural Philosophy and in the search after Physical Truth, the B Systems

Systems and Hypotheses which ingenious Men invent for explaining the appearances of Nature, and which for some time are received with applause, but afterwards are confuted by Reason and Experience; are apt to make Men think the natural causes of things absolutely impossible to be discovered at all; and have really such an effect upon very Many, as to make them reject for their sake, or at least to call in question, even the certainest Truths which have been discovered by plain Experiments or clear Mathematical demonstration it self: So in matters of Religion likewise, the inconsiderate and groundless Notions, which Men of great Learning and much Reading, have with too little Judgment sometimes joyned and intermixed with their explications of some of the greatest and most important Doctrines of Religion; when upon due Examination, the abfurdity and inconfistency of such Schemes plainly appears; have been apt to raise doubts in many Mens Minds concerning the Truth even of the certainest Doctrines themselves, which are either the most plainly discovered by right Reason, or are most

most clearly delivered in Scripture. You teach that the Soul of Man is naturally mortal, and will of it self perish and come to nothing, if not upheld by the extraordinary Power of God, in a præternatural way. Many, who see the imprudent Title of your Discourse, and will not take the pains to read the Book it felf, will conclude that you suppose the Soul to perish at the diffolution of the Body; And all Libertines, when they have read and considered all that you offer, will still conclude, that if (as you grant to them) the Soul must of it self naturally perish sometime or other, there is no time so probable when it should perish, as at the dissolution of the Body; and they will eafily perswade themselves to rely upon this, that God will not work a perpetual Miracle to preserve them preternaturally by his omnipotent Power, on purpose to inflict upon them an eternal Punishment, which by nature they were not capable of undergoing.

These Mens conclusion indeed is by no means right; But it is such a one, as is very natural for Men of loose Principles and vitious Lives to draw

from your Doctrine; And therefore you ought to have been very careful not to give them such an occasion of deceiving themselves, unless you had first been very sure that your Notion was either very plainly contained in Scripture, or very clearly demonstrable by right Reason: Which that it is not, I presume will appear from the sollowing Observations.

You begin with a distinction (Pramon. Sect. 3,) that the Souls of some Men are made immortal by the Spirit of God, to Happiness; and the Souls of some others, by the Will of God, to Punishment. Now what can be more precarious and groundless than this distinction? For what real difference is there in the thing it self, between being immortalized by the Spirit, and by the Will of God? Eternal Life and Happiness is indeed constantly attributed to the Spirit of God; that is, those only who have the Spirit of God, and are guided by it, who obey the Will of God, and live in conformity to his holy Laws, shall be partakers of Eternal Happiness: And thus the Spirit of God is indeed necessary to qualify Men

Men for, and to make them capable of, the Happiness of Heaven. But if, to make good Men capable of an Eternal Duration in order to that Happiness, it be necessary that the Spirit of God give them a new Principle of Subsistence, or superadd a new Substance to their Souls; (as your obscure Expressions concerning the Accession of an adscititions Spirit, &c, frequently seem to fignify; and without which, there is no other difference than only in Words, between being immortalized by the Spirit and by the Will of God;) then nothing can be more contrary to reason, than to suppose any Men made immortal without the addition of that new Principle; nor can any representation of Gods proceedings, be more harsh and incredible, than to suppose him by his Omnipotent Will and Power, eternally and miraculoufly preserving such Creatures unto endless Punishment, who never had in them, either originally or additionally, any Principle of Immortality at all. How plainly and how very much more agreeable to Reason and to our natural Notions of God is it, to fay that all Creatures who shall ever undergo eternal B 3

ternal Punishment, are such as having been created naturally immortal, and by wilful continuance in Sin having so far depraved themselves as to become uncapable of eternal Happiness, must consequently by the just judgment of God fall into such Misery, as their immortal nature so corrupted necessarily makes them liable to. When we speak of the Soul as created naturally immortal, we mean that it is by the Divine Pleasure created such a substance, as not having in itself any Composition, or any Principles of Corruption, will naturally or of itself continue for ever; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any Power of Nature, be dissolved or destroyed; But yet nevertheless depends continually upon God, who has Power to destroy or annihilate it, if he should so think fit. When therefore you say that the Original of the Immortality of such Souls as shall be eternally punished, may be more agreeably derived from the Divine Pleasure, than from the Nature of the Soul; if thereby you mean that the Soul was made immortal by the mere pleasure of God, in opposition to its being immortal by the necessity of its

its own Nature, in the sense that God is immortal; then indeed not Plato only, but all others also that ever held the Immortality of the Soul, have been and are of the same Opinion: But if by those Words you mean, as through the whole of your Discourse you expressly declare, that the Soul was created mortal, but by the Divine Omnipotence is upheld eternally; then it is, on the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to right Reason and to our Notions of God, to derive the Immortality of the Soul, and especially of a miserable one, from its own Nature, than from the Divine Pleasure; that is, to suppose the Soul to have been at first created such a Substance, as by the ordinary concourse of Divine Providence would continue for ever; than that it was created of a mortal and perishable Nature, but by the extraordinary and miraculous Power of God. is continually supported, only to endure Torment and Punishment, beyond the capacity of its ownNature, to all Eternity.

There cannot easily be made a worse representation of Gods dealings with Mankind, than what you affirm (Præ-B 4 mon.

mon. Sect. 4,) that if the Devils had not fallen, there had been no Hell at all; and that Mankind is no otherwise concerned in it, than as, by joyning themselves to the Devils party, they intitle themselves also to his Punishment. 'Tis true, the fire of Hell was first and originally prepared for the Devils, because they were the first and original Offenders. But to say that, without their Fall, there never would have been any Hell at all; and that the same or equal Punishment should not then have been inflicted upon Wicked Men for the same Crimes, as there now shall; is representing God like an Arbitrary Tyrant, who without caring to make an exact, equal, and particular distribution of Justice, deals with all Offenders of all ranks and degrees alike, because they have all interpretatively joyned in opposing his Anthority.

You affirm expressly (ibid.) that the Soul does not depend on our gross Organical Bodies, nor perishes upon its dissolution from those Bodies. I beseech you, if the Soul be such a substance as is incapable of being hurt by so great a change

change and dissolution, as is caused in us by a violent Death, suppose by Fire; upon what Principle can it be imagined to be naturally mortal? or what Revolutions in Nature will it not be able to refift and supervive? You explain this further, by faving, that Mens Souls do not so depend on any other created Being, but that they may still continue in their duration, what soever other created Influences be with-drawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their continuance. And is not this the very definition of Immortality? or did ever any Man mean more than this, when he affirmed the Soul to be naturally Immortal? You distinguish it indeed from the Natural Immortality of Angels; but by such a distinction, as includes not in it any the least difference. For what difference is there between affirming concerning Angels, that it is in the Power and Pleasure of God, to annihilate them when he thinks fit; and concerning Humane Souls, that they do not so depend on any other created Beings, but that they may still continue in their Duration, what soever other created Influences be withdrawn from them,

if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their Preservation? And yet in the very next Words, you very inconfistently imagine the Soul, as being a mere Flatus, to have a more immediate Dependance on God than other Creatures, than even the meanest Particles of lifeless Matter have; which must make it cease to be, whenever he is pleased to cease to breath it; as being unable to continue its Duration. by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the Support of created Beings in general. According to these last Words, the Soul being not so much as a Substance of any kind at all, is likely to be more effectually destroyed by Death, than even the Body it self. Whereas according to the Words just preceding, your Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that the Soul is by Nature Immortal, and must be mortalized by the Omnipotence of God, if ever it perish; and not, that it is by Nature Mortal, and must be immortalized by a new act of Omnipotence, to inable it to subsist for ever. So that here, you feem

feem to have framed no confistent Notion even of your own Scheme.

What you advance (Pramon. Sect. 5,) concerning its not having been culpable to hold communication and joyn with the Devil, before the Publication of the Gospel; and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his being declared so by the Gospel; is so extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy, when he tempted our first Parent? And was he not publickly declared to be so, in the Curse pronounced to him thereupon? Is not the Devil described as a publick Enemy to God and good Men, in the History of Job? And as an Eneny to Ifrael, I Chron. 21, 1? Or was he known to be an Enemy in Temperal Affairs only, (Pramon. pag. 41,) and could not be known to be so in things relating to the Life to come? Or had the Patriarchs no expectation at all of a better City to come, after the present Tabernacle was dissolved? Is not Idolatry in the Old Testament constantly branded with as severe a character of Rebellion against God, as

in the New? And in the Heathen World, before the Gospel was begun to be preached, (though the times of that Ignorance God did indeed wink at, that is, would not be so severe in punishing them, as those who should afterwards sin against greater Light;)
yet was it no Crime, to worship the Creature more than the Creator? Was it no Fault that the World did xeing in To mo inpa, lie under entire subjection to the Evil One, 1 Joh. 5, 19? and in the Power of Satan, Acts 26, 18? Were not the abominable Rites of the Heathen, plainly a facrificing to Devils? And do not all the Antient Fathers, for whose judgment you express so great an esteem, suppose in all their Writings against the Pagans, that before the proposing of the Gospel to them, they ought to have known from the Light of Nature and Right Reason, that those impure Spirits whose worship was attended with all manner of bestiality and wickedness, were pro-fessed Enemies to God and Goodness? Nay, does not St Paul himself expresly affirm, that That which may be known of God, was manifest enough to them, to have preserved them from Idolatry ?

Idolatry? and that, because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, but changed the Truth of God into a Lie, for that Reason God gave them up unto

vile affections, &c.

Nor is it less absurd, to found (as you do in the same place) the Heinousness of Sin and the Reasonableness of the Severity of its Punishment, principally upon its being interpreted as a joyning with the Devil. Idolatry indeed, and Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all Religion, may justly enough come directly under this charge; and all other Sins also may in effect and in event, not improperly be looked upon as a promoting the Interest of the Devil, and an opposing the establishment of the Kingdom of God: But to make the formal Reason, the heinousness and demerit, not only of Idolatry, Witchcraft, and Profane open Opposition of Religion, but also of all other Sins whatsoever, to consist not so much in the original depravity of the Actions themselves, in their contrariety to Right Reason and to the Light of Nature and Conscience, in their opposition to the Nature and Will and Law and Authority of God, as in their

their being interpretatively a joyning and communication with the Devil 3 To suppose God inflicting upon Men fuch a Punishment, not as their Sins deserve in their own Nature, and fuch as the Nature of their own Souls makes them capable of falling into by wilful and obstinate corruption and depravation of themselves, but such as \* is disproportionable to their Nature. \* Premon. and + exceeding the natural Powers of their degree of Being; and to account for this, only by faying, that Christ will so interpret their not joyning with Him, as if they had joyned themselves to the Devil; Is not all this, to make \* Pramon. God, in the hardest Sense, act \* arbipag. 27. travily?

p. 30.

+ ibid. p. 28.

> Your Interpretation of Ro. 2, 12. and of Joh. 3, 19. (Prem. Sect. 6.) is so loose and groundless, that any Text may in the same manner be brought to prove any thing, or rather no Text can really prove any thing at all. For if when St Paul fays, Rom. 2, 12. that as many as have finned without Law, shall also perish without Law; and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by the Law; the Word periff be not evidently Synonymous

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nymous to being judged or condemned, and fignifies that every Sinners condemnation or punishment shall be proportionable to the heinousness of his Sin with respect to the Light he sinned against; but on the contrary from the Word [ amorgume ] shall perish, it can be concluded that the Persons spoken of shall only barely cease to be, in opposition to the Word [ new 3 is sortal ] shall be judged or condemned; It will follow equally from the use of the same Word in other places of Scripture, that neither rejecters of the Gospel, nor wicked Christians, nor even the Devils themselves, shall be condemned to any other Punishment, than bare ceasing to be: For of all these, it is said in several places of Scripture, that [ & TONOV-Tai] they shall perish or be destroyed: and thus you unwarily overthrow all the Threatnings of the Gospel. Again, if when our Saviour says, Joh. 3. 19. that This is the condemnation, that Light is come into the World, and Men love Darkness rather than Light; his plain meaning be not this, that the clear Revelation of the Will of God made to Mankind in the Gospel, and the express denunciation of his Wrath against Sin,

is the great Aggravation of Impenitence, and that which makes Mens obstinately continuing in their Sinsutterly inexcusable, and their condemnation evidently most just, because they cannot now pretend ignorance of their Duty: but the Words [ Auth in neion This is the Condemnation, must signifie a particular Kind of Punishment to be inflicted upon Men for Associating with the Devil as being the Prince of Darkness; I cannot fee but by the same Liberty, any Asserter of any new Opinion may interpret any part of Scripture so as to countenance any the most groundless Fancy or Imagination what soever.

Is it not a very weak Hypothefis, to imagine that the Souls of Men
must needs be naturally Mortal, because otherwise God would not know
how to dispose of the Souls of the
Heathen; since there cannot be anythird.
Eternal State, suitable to the Nature of a
Rational Soul; neither happy, nor miserable; as there must be, if those Souls be
naturally Immortal? (Pramon. p. 43.)
Is not the Universe large enough, for
God to dispose of all his Creatures into States suitable to their Natures?

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Are there not in Gods House many Mansions? Or will Heaven and Hell be two such Places, in which there will be no Differences of States, no space for Order and variety of degrees? Does not our Saviour himself expressly tell us, that they who knew not their Masters will, and yet did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with sew stripes? And does not St Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, plainly declare that Gentiles as well as Jews shall be judged according to their Works?

The rest of your Præmonition, being upon a different subject, I forbear to consider at this time.

In the Discourse itself (Sect. 2,) you propose a most dark and unintelligible Notion, concerning [\psi\_n\chi and \pi and \pi \text{rev}\mu a] Soul and Spirit; not only distinguishing the rational Soul from the sensitive; which was the Philosophy of many of the Antients; but moreover making the Spirit different from both, and wholly præternatural to Man. The whole natural Soul (\psi\_n\chi) including both

both the sensitive and the Rational part, (which you elsewhere call the two Souls. pag. 220,) you suppose to be of it self mortal, but to be made immortal in good Christians by the addition of the Spirit, (by the Accession of an Adscititions Spirit, as you sometimes express it,) and in the rejecters of the Gospel to be made immortal without it. If by the Spirit you mean only an Operation of the Spirit of God upon our Souls, than (as I observed before) there is no real difference between being immortalized by the Spirit and by the Will of God. But if by the Spirit you mean the addition of a new Substance or Principle of Subfistence to the Souls of good Christians in order to immortalize them, which yet in them that reject the Gospel are immortalized without that addition; Is not this just fuch another supposition, as if you should suppose the Understanding to be one Substance in a Man, and the Will another, and the Habit of Virtue a third; notwithstanding that at the same time it be confessed that all these things may be Faculties or Powers of one and the same Substance? And

And your perverting the words of St Paul to serve your obscure Hypothesis, is very gross. Does St Paul, when he distinguishes the natural Body [ Juxenor σωμα from the Spiritual Body [πνευμα]ικόν σωμα, and calls the one corruptible, the other incorruptible; mean that the natural Body [ Juginov or us] is therefore corruptible or mortal, because the Soul [ Juxi ] or Principle of Life which is in it, is itself a \* Mortal Principle? Or \* Pag. 3. that the Spiritual Body [πνευματικών σώμα] is made incorruptible by the superaddition of a new Spirit to the Soul that animates it? The plain meaning of St Paul is only this, that the Body which in this present state is dissolvible and corruptible, shall after the resurrection, by the Power of God, be made incorruptible; without having any respect at all to the Soul; or the Nature of it, in his whole Discourse. Again, when St Paul derives our Title to the Resurrection of the Body, wholly from Christ; does he thereby mean to affirm, that, without the Resurrection of Christ, the Souls of must also have ceased to exist? On the contrary, for that very reason, because the Souls of Men would not C 2 have

have ceased to exist; therefore Christ thought them of value to redeem them from Misery, by the purchase of his Blood, by his Death and Resurrection. And 'tis the worst representation of Christianity, that can be; something that \* Pag. 5. might indeed \* be thought hard dealing; to suppose (as you do) that the Gospel of Christ, which is every where in Scripture represented as the greatest instance of God's tender Mercy and Compassion towards Men, should upon the whole so very dispropartionably increase the Misery of sinful Men, as that whoever disbelieved or neglected that new offer of Grace and Favour, should from thenceforth be condemned to everlasting Torments; notwithstanding that otherwife Sin, in its own Nature, against the Light of Reason and Conscience and the natural Law of God, was so little heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they that had lived in the utmost contempt of God and of his natural and eternal Law written in their Hearts, and in the most unrestrained practise of all possible wickedness, might have been safe from the fear of any other danger, than that of perish-

perishing finally by a natural Mortality.

Your Conclusion from our Saviours description of the last judgment, Mat. 25, is very extraordinary; [Sect. 3;] that because the rewardableness of the good Works of the Righteous, is there ascribed to their having been done for Christ's sake; therefore no other Persons shall be concerned in that Judgment, but those to whom the Gospel had been made known. You might exactly as well have concluded, that because Charity and Uncharitableness are the only particular Actions there mentioned, for which Men shall be adjudged to Reward or Punishment therefore no regard shall be had to any other Virtues or Crimes in that final Judgment. It is evident by comparing other places of Scripture, that all kinds of Actions shall then be examined; and it is as evident, that all forts of Persons shall be so too. Those who never heard of the Gospel, 'tis true, cannot be judged by the same Rule or Form, as those who did hear of it; But is it not very wonderful, to conclude from thence, that because \* such persons must \* pas. be judged by another form not fully and C 3 ex-

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expressly (suppose) mentioned in Scripture, therefore that form cannot at all be known what it is; and if that form could not be known, yet that therefore it ought not to be believed that there is any such form at all? Does not the same Light of Reafon, which makes Men a Law to themselves, necessarily discover also to them at the same time what Rule they shall be judged by? Neither is it true therefore, that no such Form can be proved from the Scriptures: For does not St Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, largely declare that there is fuch a Form, and also what that Form is? And does not the Scripture every where plainly suppose, that the Judgment shall be universal? The Phrase of judging the World, Acts 17, 31, manifestly implies it; and the opposition between Death and Judgment Heb. 9, 27, though the stress of the Apostles argument does not indeed lie uponit, and the universal particle [All] is not added, yet very evidently supposes the Judgment to extend to the very same Persons as Death doth. And what difference is there, between faying that 'tis appointed for Men once to die, or that 'tis appointed for All Men once

once to die? It is not a just answer here, to say that Universal affertions are frequently in Scripture to be understood in a limited Sense. That can only be so, when either the common acceptation of the words, evidently limits their fignification; as in that place you mention, Joh. 12, 19; or when some other parallel places of Scripture, expressly add a Limitation. Where this is not the case, as it is not in the phrase of Gods judging the World, Acts 17, 31; the same expression being in all other places of Scripture likewise universal; if limitations may be added arbitrarily and at pleasure, there will then be no way left to distinguish at all, when any declaration is to be looked upon as universal, and when as only particular. You your felf are forced to allow the Jews, who lived before our Saviours coming, to be concerned in the Judgment; and not them only, but also Others who lived before the Law, in the Times of Noah and the Patriarchs; because (pag. 11.) as they were intitled to the Spirit in Reversion, so they might be intitled to the Consequences of the Spirit, one of which is Immortality.

I suppose you will easily grant, that the Knowledge many of these Men had of Christ, was but implicit and very obscure: And if that was sufficient to intitle them to Immortality, why is it not as easy to suppose that the Promise God made to Adam might entitle all Mankind to have some benefit of the Redemption purchased by Christ, according to their different proportions and capacities, though they never

heard of him explicitly?

It may here be observed also by the by, that, according to your obscure and indeed confused manner of expresfing your self, you in this Section (pag. 8,) suppose the Holy Spirit to immortalize Men to Punishment; and again, (pag. 31,) that Men are qualified for the high. er degree of Punishment, by the Accession of the ad Cititions Spirit, which makes them isayyeros: Not very confistently with your first distinction, (Pramon. Sect. 3,) that the actually immortalizing Souls to Punishment, may better be ascribed to the Pleasure of God, than to the Divine Spirit. Unless you will say, that bad Men within the Covenant, are immortalized to Punishment by one Principle; and bad Men without the Covenant

#### A Letter to Mr Dodwell.

Covenant, or Rejecters of it, immortalized to Punishment by another Principle. And so there is no end of vain and groundless Imaginations.

That there shall be, as you say, (Sect. 4,) a very great difference in the Punishment of those who resist and reject the Gospel, from what it would have been if they had never heard of the Gospel; is undoubtedly very true. But does it from thence follow, that God did not + oblige Men at all to worship himself, + Pag. 11, before any revealed Religion was insti- & 12. tuted? Because the \* Scripture does in- \* Pag. 13. deed every where Suppose the Condition of those who resist the Gospel-dispensation, worse than that of the worst sort of Criminals who never heard of the Gospel; does it from thence follow, that they that never heard of the Gospel, had therefore no concern at all in the final judgment? Because our Saviour declares that it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of Judgment, than for those who rejected the Gospel when offered them; does it from thence follow, that those wicked People shall not be cast into \* outerdar! - \* Pag. 14 ness at all? When our Saviour threatens that

that Capernaum, which was exalted to Heaven, should be brought down to Hell; is it not a very extraordinary Interpretation of the meaning of those Words, and as wonderful an Inference from them, to conclude that those People, if our Saviour had not preached to them, would have it had no reason to trag. 14. fear the Punishment of Hell at all? An unprejudiced Person would rather conclude on the contrary, that for that very reason, because they were in danger of it, therefore our Saviour preached to them and exhorted them to repent and flee from the wrath to come. Lastly, if they that never heard of the Gospel, shall not indeed for their Unbelief be sentenced to \* that Hell, which was prepared for the Devil and his

Angels; that is, to the same degree of

Punishment with those who reject or

disobey the Gospel; yet does it at all

from thence follow, that they shall

have no concern in the general Judg-

ment, upon account of their having

obeyed or disobeyed the Law of Na-

ture ?

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The case (Sect. 6.) of that Text in St John, Joh. 5, 28 and 29; The Hour is coming, in the which all that are in the Graves shall near his Voice, And shall come forth, they that have done good. unto the Resurrection of Life, and they that have done evil, unto the Resurrection of Damnation, is exactly the same with that before-mentioned, Acts 17, 31. The Words are universal; and the instances you bring of other universal Affirmations, which must be understood in a limited Sense, have not the least fimilitude with the Text you are considering. If the Gibeonites universal Declaration to David, that for them he should not kill any Man in Israel, must needs indeed be understood in a limited Sense, because they themselves expressy limited it by demanding seven of Sanl's Posterity to be delivered to them to be put to Death: If Ahab's fending to all Nations and Kingdoms to fearch for Elijah, must indeed of necessity, in the Nature of the thing it felf, be understood only of those that bordered upon him: If St Paul's univer-Jal Declaration, that he baptized none of the Corinthians, must indeed be understood with an exception; because he himself himself in the very next Words adds an exception expressly: Is it just to infer from these Instances, that our Saviour's universal Assirmation in this place, concerning the Resurrection, may likewise be understood in a limited Sense, tho neither in the Nature of the thing it self, nor from the Context, there be any the least Ground for such limitation? nay though on the contrary, all the parallel Texts, which are very many, be likewise universal? It is a wonderful thing, to see in what manner Learned Men can argue, when Prejudices prevail over their Judgment.

Your 7th Section, to ordinary understandings, seems to be mere Confusion. You suppose Man to consist of three distinct parts, Body, Soul and Spirit: But they who made this distinction, supposed these three parts to be in all Men by Nature; which will not serve your purpose. You bring in Plato distinguishing Mind [Ni.] from [1020] Soul, and making the one mortal, the other immortal: But this likewise, being spoken concerning the natural formation of all Men, is nothing to your purpose; For in your Hypothesis,

thesis, you make the whole Man by nature Mortal. You mention Plato here (pag. 22 & 24, ) and again pag. 59 & 96, and Pramon. pag. 21, as favouring your own Notions: And yet in other places, (as pag. 33, 60 & 66.) you inconsistently speak of him as justly blamed for holding the contrary Opinion, for afferting Our Doctrine of the Souls natural Immortality, pag. 33. You affirm (pag. 23,) that there is no real difference between the Platonical Notions and those of the new Testament, only that That which the Platonists call Mind [Nec, ] and make it Immortal, the Sacred Writers call [TVEU μα] Spirit, as being the Divine Breathing, Gen. 2, 7: Here you openly contradict your felf, making the immortal [πνευμα] Spirit, common to all Men by their original formation, and confounding it with what you elfewhere so \* often, in allusion to that \* Pramon. very Text, distinguish by the name pag. 21 & [mvch] Breath, and make it mortal. 25; and rou bring in Philo distinguishing the course it. immortal Soul from the sensible formed self, pag. Man, as you darkly express it; But 216. even this also is directly against you: For Philo, opposing the immortal Mind of

of Man, that is, the rational Soul, both to the Body and to the sensitive Soul, still speaks of them all as original and natural Parts of the Man; And therefore when you apply to your Hypothesis of an adscititions Spirit, what he fays concerning this [ TVETHA SHOV] Divine Spirit or Soul infused into Man by Gods breathing, Gen. 2, 7; you again directly contradict your felf, by confounding the Spirit [ TIE Jua] which you suppose immortal, with the [ Trois] Breath or Soul which you make to be You cite (pag. 26) the words mortal. of Aratus, To & i yiv four, as approved by St Paul, Acts 17, 28: But if those words prove any thing, they prove directly against you: For yir@ sie, if it signifies any thing, signisses Off-spring of God in that Sense which you oppose, (page 66.) And though you are pleased to understand them (pag. 66,) only of Those that are immortalized by receiving or rejecting the Gospel, yet St Paul on the contrary as plainly applies them to all that dwell on the Face of the Earth, as it could be expressed in words.

In the same Section, (pag. 22,) you call it a precarious Fancy, to make every Cause

Cause of Motion distinct from Matter, to be properly what we call a Spirit, Independent on Matter, and Immortal: Here you seem to suppose the Soul of Man, to be something distinct from Matter; yet not a Spirit, nor Independent on Matter, least from thence it should follow that it was naturally immortal. In your Præmonition, pag. 25, you make the Soul, as being a mere Flatus, to have a more precarious subsistence even than mere Matter itfelf, saying that it is unable to continue its own Duration by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general: Yet in the same page (as I observed before) you say that Souls do not so depend on any other Created Being, but that they may still continue in their Duration, what soever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence which is essentially necessary for their continuance: This is making them properly Immortal. In the Discourse itself, pag. 51, you suppose again that the Soul may depend on Matter, as to its Being and Preservation, though

though it be not a Modification of Matter, but distinct from it: Here you express your self, as if you thought it a Substantial Form, a contradictory Chimæra, which arose merely from the misconstruction of a Greek Word in Aristotle, signifying indifferently either Substantial or Essential: And again, pag. 91, you suppose in like manner, that the Soul is something distinct both from Spirit, and also from Matter and Motion; that is to say, a Material Form; an active Substantial Principle, distinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter, in esse, in sieri, in operari, and which must accordingly be dissolved on the dissolution of that Matter on which it depends. In pag. 220, you suppose, on the other hand, the Two Souls (as you call them) to be not only distinct, but also separable: And pag. 218, you seem to incline to the Notion of those Philosophers, who owned the avon to be material like the steams of odoriferous Bodies; Which Consideration alone, you say, is sufficient to cut it off from any pretensions to any proper natural Immortality. Is not all this, the greatest Extravagancy and Confusion that can be? Did not the World know you

you to be a serious Person, these things would look much more like the Raillery of an Unbeliever, than the Reasonings of one that in earnest intended to establish any consistent Notion. In reality, That the Soul cannot possibly be Material, is evident not only from the confideration of its noble Faculties, Capacia ties and Improvements, its large Comprehension and Memory, its Judgment, Power of Reasoning, and moral Faculties; which Arguments have been urged with unanswerable Strength by the wisest and most considerate Men in all Ages, from the times of Socrates and Plato to this very Day; but the same thing is moreover demonstrable from the single consideration, even of bare Sense or Consciousness it self. For Matter being a divisible Substance, confifting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct parts, tis plain, that unless it were effentially Conscious, in which case every particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Conscionsnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, can be an Individual Conscious Being: For, suppose three or three

three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given distance one from another; is it possible that all those separate parts should in that State be one individual Conscious Being? Suppose then all these Particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings, than they were when at the greatest distance? How then can their being disposed in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being? If you will suppose God by his infinite Power superadding Consciousness to the united Particles, yet still those Particles, being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themfelves the Subject in which that individual Consciousness inheres, but the Consciousness can only be superadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles must still it self be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whose Power of Thinking is undeniably one Individual Consciousness, cannot possibly be a Material Substance. And if it be neither Matter nor w any Modification of Matter, then (tho' you are

are pleased to † affirm somewhat rash-† Pag. 51. ly, and without offering any reason for your affirmation, that such Reasoning is far from being Self-evident, yet) it is really as notoriously Self-evident as any thing in Nature, that it cannot possibly depend upon Matter, as to its Being and Preservation. For if even one particle of Matter cannot possibly depend upon another, as to its Being and Preservation, (which I believe you will confess to be Self-evident,) because they are each of them distinct Beings; must it not be even yet less possible, for a Being which is neither Matter itself, nor a Modification of Matter, but entirely distinct from Matter, (pag. 51;) to depend on Matter as to its Being and Pre-Servation?

It is not indeed of any great moment in the present dispute; but it seems to show in general something of hast and inconsistency in your Notions; what you affirm concerning the Giants, Sect. 8. who, you say, descended from the Sons of Seth and the Daughters of Cain; and yet in the very same Paragraph you call them the Off-spring of the Fallen Angels; and, upon their account, make

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two

two defections of Angels, one before the Fall of Adam, the other before the Flood.

You proceed (Sect. 9) to the Authority of the Fathers. Justin Martyr, whom you begin with, says indeed expressly, that the Soul ought not properly to be called Immortal: But this he says, not, as you represent him, in opposition to our Doctrine, nor yet in opposition to Plato, but in opposition to the extravagant Notions of some

† Έι αθάνατός & ψυχή, αχέννητ Θ δηλαδή. αχέννη Θ δε εξ αθάνατ Θ ές ι κατά πνας λεγομίνες πλατωνικές. Dialog. cum Tryph. who taught such an Immortality as implied necessity of existence. For, the reason he gives why Souls

ought not to be called Immortal, is because \* they had a beginning,

\* 'Avayun i rais \u00e4v\u00e4ais and depend continually upon

yayovivas — ex aea a davator, ibid. and depend continually upon God for the Preservation of their Being. In which

sense, neither are Angels Immortal; but \* God only. All that

† Μόνος δ αλέννητ Φ τ he says therefore, does not in the least imply, but

that the Soul may be such a substance, as is able to continue its
own Duration for ever, by the
Powers

Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general; Which is all that we mean by natural Immortality. Nay, that he did actually think the Soul to be in this sense Immortal, may justly be gathered from those very words which you your self cite from him: 'Οτι αυτδς
μίν ης φθαρτίς &c, What Plato thought concerning the World, that it must needs indeed be in its Nature capable of being destroyed and brought to an End, because it had a beginning; yet that God would never actually destroy it: The same may be thought concerning the Soul, and concerning all things that are or can be, excepting only God himself, ( and TE ¿Zapavidivai) that they are capable of being destroyed: Which last words seem clearly to explain what he means by the word [pagrav] corruptible, which he applies not only to the Soul of Man, but also to all Created Beings whatsoever; namely, not to signify any Tendency to Corruption in the Nature of the thing itself, but only a Dependence upon the Will of God, in opposition to Self-existence. He does indeed fay, D 3

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say, that the Souls of the Damned shall continue to exist as long as God thinks sit; and implies as if he thought they should finally be destroyed, after very long Punishment: But this, not by a natural Mortality, but by the Will of God, who is as able to destroy if he thinks sit, as to create: Which Opinion, if there was any ground for it, would yet signify nothing at all to your purpose.

Tatians Opinion, if it was of any Authority, would prove too much for For he fancied that the Soul was you. dissolved with the Body, and rose again with it at the Resurrection. This part you pleasantly call his Humane Reasoning, (Sect. 10;) as if you thought all the rest of what he says in the very same sentence, was immediately Divine. Yet even He also is expressly against you. For ashe makes all Souls to die with the Body, so he makes them all to rise again with it also; leaving none of them in their natural Mortality; but raising them all, either to eternal Happiness, ΟΓ [ Βάνατον διά πμωείας ον ά θανασία λαμβάνετα] to Immortal Punishment.

Irenaus is so very full and express against you, and your perverting of his words fo very gross, that with the same liberty any person might easily make any Author seem to countenance any Herefy or abfurd Opinion whatfoever, even from the very words themselves, wherein he with all possible clearness expresses himself against it. The passages which you your self cite, are as clear and plain as can be desired. He in express words (as you your felf cite them,) declares the Soul to

\* be immortal in its own does † not die. To evade tura adest vivere. lib. 5. c. nature, and affirms that it this, you suppose he 4. means only, that the Soul

+ ibid. c. 7.

does not die in the same Manner that the Body does, namely by ceasing to breathe; A more surprizing evasion could not possibly have been invented: His words, which the Reader would expect you should have transcribed at length, are these; that † 'tis the Body

[caro] enim est, quæ morietur & solvitur; sed non Anima, neg; Spiritus. Mori enim, est vitalem amittere habilitatem, & sine Spiramine in posterum, & inanimalem & immobilem sieri, & deperire in illa, ex quibus & initium substantiæ habuit. Hoc autem neg; Animæ evenit; flatus est enim vitæ: neg; Spiritui; incompositue est enim & simplex Spiritus, qui resolvi non potest. lib. 5, \$ 7.

only

only that dies, not the Soul: For, to die, is to lose the Powers of Life; Breath, Sense and Motion; and to be separated into its first Principles of Composition; which the Soul, the Flatus vitæ, and the Spirit which is a simple and uncompounded and indissolvible substance, cannot be: Is not the word [Spiramen] Breath, in this sentence, an excellent ground for your distinction; that Ireneus by denying that the Soul dies, does not mean to deny that it dies, but only to deny that it dies in the same Manner the Body does, viz. by ceasing to breath? Again,

† Ουτε δ η Ιυχή Θνητον, ετε τὸ πνευμα, lib. 5, 13, as the words are cited by you: & lib. 5. 7, almost the same words again.

Soul does not actually die When the Body dies; But, being ashamed of this Interpretation, you add immediately, that he means also further, that the Soul in its own Nature, does not consist of contrary Principles, tending to a Dissolution by its own Nature, as the Body does: This is expressly giving up the whole Question; and directly contrary to what you add presently after, that Death is natural to the Soul, on account of its natural

He expressly affirms, that †

the Soul and Spirit is not

mortal: By this you say

tural constitution. It is here further to be observed also, that these last words which you your self cite out of Ireneus, that the Soul and Spirit is not Mortal, [ ste i duxin ste tò mveuma,] are directly contradictory to the Notion you advance, pag. 3, concerning [ ou ua Juganor ] the natural Body's being therefore opposed to [ TVEU MAT 100 ] I Cor. 15, 44, because it has only a Mortal Principle [ fuzi] in it; and also directly contradictory to what you infinuate pag. 41, concerning Ireneus's understanding [ Tron (an ] the Breath of Life, Gen. 2, 7, to be, what You all along would distinguish it to be, a Mortal principle: Which he is indeed so far from doing, that, on the contrary, he. in that very Chapter from whence you have taken most of your Citations, declares [ with the Soul, not to be mortal,

\*Quæ funt ergo mortalia corpora? nunquidnam Animæ? Sed incorruptibiles Animæ, quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum. Infufflavit enim in faciem hominis Deus flatum vitæ (Gen. 2, 7,) &

factus est in animam viventem; Flatus autem vita, incorporalis est. Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere hominem ipsum statum vitæ existentem. Er propter hoc David aie; Et anima mea
illi vivet; tanquam immortali substantia una ejus existente. lib. 3, c. 7.

as St Paul, does from πνεύμα ζωοποιών; The πνεύμα ζωοποιών being plainly with him, as it is with St Paul, that divine Power which Spiritualizes and Immortalizes, not the Soul, but the Body at the Refurrection.

Irenaus does indeed, with other Antient Writers, allow, that whatever is younton or had a beginning, must be esagrio, that is, as Justin Martyr expresses it, sold to Earpanies in, capable of being destroyed. But this is only meant (as the Antithesis of the words [yevuntiv] and [osagriov] evidently shows) of the Nature of the Soul as opposed, together with that of Angels and of all other the highest Created Beings whatsoever, to That Immortality which arises from Necessity of Existence, which must needs be peculiar to God alone: Which is nothing to Your purpose.

I cannot see how you collect any thing at all from Athenagoras, (Sect. 12.) He does indeed distinguish No. from  $4u\chi n$  according to the old Philosophy; but he does not found any thing upon that distinction, which is in the least to your purpose. He neither affirms the Soul to be mortal, nor makes

makes any doubt but the Bodies of all Men shall rise again unto Judgment. All you pretend to gather from him, is, that the Soul is not itself sufficient to immortalize the Body: But to this you have your self given a full Anfwer, that No body ever thought it was.

The words you cite from Theophilus Antiochenus, (Sect. 13,) relate wholly to the Question concerning the state of Adam in Paradise, whether he was Created Mortal or Immortal in that State: Nothing therefore can be gathered from thence, concerning the Nature of a separate Soul. Theophilus determines, that He was neither Mortal nor

Immortal \* originally by his Creation; that is, (as you your felf explain it, pag. 46,) God neither defign'd for him Corporal Death, nor Corporal Immortality; but he was capable of being either, according as he should behave himself: But whether Adam before his Fall was in that Sense naturally immortal, or

\* Note, your Emendation, iy muai for iyw wer, in this passage of Theophilus, is without ground. For the Sense is not, [ide two, in fuppose, but [ide two, in wo ver, ] I dare not affert That neither, for my part; answering to [ile 1270. cause in the preceeding line; As any one that pleales to compare your Bock, may observe.

naturally

naturally mortal; what is this to the Soul? which, supposing Adam never so mortal, you your self acknowledge does not perish by that mortality which denominates a Man Mortal, that is, the

Diffolution of the Body.

His faying that from That Text. Gen. 2, 7, most Men [ TAGIOVES] stilled the Soul immortal; does not imply (as you imagine) that Theophilus himfelf thought it mortal; but it implies some doubt concerning the proper use of the word asavalo, which (as has been before noted) seemed to many of the Antients to imply as much as agiven ! Necessarily-existing, (in the Sense that St Paul says of God, 1 Tim. 6, 16, Movo Exwr adavasiar, that He only bath Immortality;) or at least to fignify an indefectible State of Virtue and Happiness: And therefore it is, that he says concerning Adam, 'El adávator autor an' 'agxis έπεποιύκα, θεδυ αν επεποιώκα: If Adam had been made originally immortal, he bad been made a God.

It is also further to be observed from this passage of Theophilus, that the Text you so frequently allude to, Gen. 2, 7, was must rois arction by most of the Antients, understood in a Sense directly

rectly contrary to your Notion of the mon signifying in that place a Mortal Principle. And it is with very extra-ordinary difficulty, that you here labour to suppose, that [meioves] those most Men whom Theophilus affirms to have collected the Immortality of the Soul from this Text of Scripture, were not Christians, but either Jewish Pharisees or Heathen Philosophers: Which Supposition, of Heathen Philosophers proving the Immortality of the Soul from a Text of Scripture; and that a Christian Writer speaking of most Mens Sense concerning a Text of Scripture, should thereby mean the Sense of Heathen Philosophers; This, I say, with all, that follows in that Section, is fo ex. tremely absurd, as to need no Confutation.

Tertullian does indeed suppose the Soul to be Material; From whence it must also necessarily be confessed to sollow, that it would be naturally Montal; and no one can (as you say, Sect. 14,) believe such a Soul as he suppose s, to be independent on Matter in its own Nature. All this is very true; and yet even This seems to be nothing to your

your purpose. For though the natural Mortality of the Soul is indeed a necessary Consequence of Tertullian's Doctrine; yet, since Tertullian did not fee nor own that Consequence; and, if he had seen the Consequence, would have disowned the Doctrine; his Authority (which is what you would make use of) is not for you, though the Con-Sequence of his Doctrine be: And therefore you are guilty of a very manifest Fallacy, when you fay (pag. 55.) that the Church had not declared against this Doctrine of Tertullian, which supposed the Souls natural Mortality: For his Doctrine did not then suppose it, tho' our Philosophy shows it to be indeed a Consequence. He says expressly in many places of his Book de Anima. that the Soul is Immortal: He reckons this among those Opinions of the Philosophers which gave occasion to Here-

\* Alii immortalem negant Animam. cap. 5.

+ Cæterum animam fubtantia crescere negandum ft, ne etiam decrescere k defectum credatur. cap. 17.

sies, that \* some of them denied the Immortality of the Soul: He denied + that the Soul grew or inubstantia dicatur. atq, ita creased in substance, notwithstanding he thought it Material; least it should

follow from thence, that it was capable likewise

wise of perishing: He strongly \* opposes the Opinion of those who thought the Soul received Nourishment; least from thence likewise it should follow that it was liable to perish: He expressly affirms, † that all Mankind, without exeption, shall rise again to eternal Happiness or Punishment:

\* Auferenda est Argamentatoris occasio, qui, quod anima desiderare videatur alimenta, hinc quoq; mortalem eam intelligi cupit, quæ cibis sustineatur, deniq; derogatis eis evigescat, postremo subtractis intercidat. cap. 38.

† Restituetur omne humanum genus — exinde in immensam æternitatis perpetuitatem. Id. in Apologe-

tico.

And many other such Passages are to be found in his Works. You seem to be aware of this, when you say, that Tertullian does indeed own the actual Immortality of the Soul: But then, what you infinuate in your next Words, [Especially of all who were, upon that account, obliged to come over as Proselytes upon the Publication of the Gospel,] is extremely unfair; since Tertullian's Words, being every where as universal as can be, are directly contrary to what you would infinuate by the Word Especially.

And here upon occasion of the Passages you cite out of Tertullian, concerning the Propagation of the Soul extraduce, and its having a Humane Shape and Difference of Sex; I cannot forbear

proposing it to your more calmand seriious consideration, whether your manner of citing the Fathers, by picking out chiefly fuch Sentences, wherein for want of Philosophy they were evidently mistaken, and which can only be of differvice to Religion, and tend to confirm profane Men in their Mockery and Contempt; is not a very ill representation of those Writers, and a very ill manner of showing your regard to I believe, should any other Person do the like upon any other Philosophical Subject, you would immediately look upon him as doing it with an ill defign, and deferving a very fevere Censure.

What you say (Sect. 16.) concerning Tertullian's deriving the Humane Soul from the Flatus Vita mention'd Gen 2, 7; proves, not that he thought the Soul Mortal, because you groundlessly interpret that Text so; but that he understood that Text contrary to what you have done, because he clearly declares the Soul derived thence to be Immortal: As I have before shown particularly concerning Irenaus. And what you offer in the rest of that Paragraph,

ragraph, concerning proper Immortality belonging only to God, is all entirely against your self, and not in the least against our Notion; as has likewise been proved before.

The words you cite out of St Cyprian. (Sect. 18) are evidently nothing to your purpose; being spoken only concerning regeneration or the new birth in the moral Sense, without any the least hint of any natural mortality of the Souls of those who are not regenerated. Arnobius, you vour self acknowledge to have his Paradoxes on this Subject; that he was but a Catechumen, when he wrote his book; and was not truly instructed in the Christian Doctrine. But, you say, he is more to be regarded, when he speaks conformably to the Sense of other Catholick Doctors of that early Age, that is, when you think he fays any thing agreeable to that Notion which you not truly attribute to the Fathers. And yet even He, does not say any thing really agreeable to that Notion. For though he does indeed blame the boldness of certain Platonists for supposing the Soul to be \* necessarily Immortal, to \* Animus, qui im-

mortalis a vobis & Deus esse narratur, &c. lib. 2.

have

have come from Heaven, and to return thither again of course at the dissolution of the body; running out with much oratorical Liberty upon the weakness of those Mens Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul; and does Himfelf contend that the Soul is of a

+ Medietas ergo quæ-

+ middle Nature, neither dam, & animarum anceps mortal, nor immortal, ambiguay; natura, &c. lib. but capable of either condition according to its be-

haviour; yet all this he does purely upon That Argument, that whatever had a beginning, must also necessarily be capable of being destroyed; and that whatever is passible, must needs in its Nature be liable to perish; and accordingly therefore applies it to An-

† Omnes omnino, Dii, Angeli, Dæmones, aut nomine quocunq; funt alio, qualitatis & ipsi sunt mediæ, & ambiguæ fortis conditione mutabiles. lib. 2.

gels + and all other Created Beings whatfoever, in the very same Sense as he does to Men: Which is not the Notion of Mortality You are contending for.

And when he supposes the Souls of the Wicked to perish finally, (which you imagine to be for your purpose; ) he understands it of all the damned, as well those that had heard the Gospel, as those that had not; and those that had had received the Spirit, asthole that had not; conceiving them all to be destroyed by the Power of God inflicting such Punishment upon them, and not that any die by a natural mortality.

Last antius is throughout his whole work as full and express against you, as any Author that ever wrote either before or since. So that your perverting his words to favour your Notion, is really, what upon second thoughts you yourself will hardly excuse. I shall first show briefly, how clearly he afferts the natural Immortality of the Soul, and then consider in how very extraordinary a manner you misrepresent him.

He approves \* that No-\* Licet verum de animæ tion of Plato, which you immortalitate sentiret, or. + so often condemn, con- 4ib. 7. 58. t pag 38, 66, dec. cerning the natural Immortality of the Soul; He declares, that. \* the Soul does not pe-\* Apparet, animam non rish, nor is dissolved, but .interire, neg; daffolvi, fed endures for every He is manere in Sempiternum. lib. 7. \$9. very large, and particular in the confuting all Lucretius's Argu- † lib 7, 5 ments against the natural Immortali-12 &c. ty of the Soul: He affirms, that \* \*Quod it, in Terram resolvitur; quod ex calesti Spiritu, id constar ac viger Semper, quoniam divinus Spiritus sempiternuseft. lib. 7, 5 12.

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at Death the Body returns to the Earth; but That part of ourselves, which God breathed into us, endures and lives for

† Ergo anima, quæ fragilis non est, in æternum manet; quoniam Origo ejus æterna eft. ibid.

ever; And again; that f the Soul is not corruptible, but indures for ever; because it proceeded from an eternal Original : And concludes;

animam non este solubilem. lib. 7. § 13.

\* I think, saith he, I have \* Declaravi, ut opinor, sufficiently proved the Soul is not dissolvible. He expresses himself in the very

same manner concerning the natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good ones. The Effect of that Death, saith

\* Cujus [mortis] non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, fed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pænani, secundam morteni nominamus, quæ eft & ipsa perpetua, sicut & im-mortalitas. — Mors Secunda, est aterni doloris perpeffio; Mors est animatum pro mericis ad æterna Tupplicia damnatio. lib.2. § 12.

\* he, which wicked Souls are subject to, is not the extinguishing of them, but the punishing them eternally: This Punishment we call the second Death; which is itself also perpetual, as eternal Happiness is; The fecond Death, is the Suffering eternal Torment; the

of Souls to eternal Pu-+ Sicut damnation Vita Ani- nistment, according to their deserts. mæ sempi- Again : As the Life of the Soul, saith † in qua divinos & incloquibiles immortalitatis suæ fructus capit; ita & mors ejus perperua fit necesse est, in qua perennes pænas & infinita cormenta pro peccatis suis pendet.lib. 7, \$ 11.

he,

he, is eternal, in which it injoys divine and unspeakable Happiness; so its Death also must needs be eternal, in which it endures everlasting punishment and endless Torments for its Sins. And again: Death, Saith \* he, does - 13 Mors autem non fundinot destroy and extinguish

this perimit ac delet, fed the Soul, but subjects it to mernis afficit cruciatibus. lib. 7, § 12. eternal Torments. And

that all this might not pollibly be undeplood either of your immortalizing Spirit, or of the mere Will and Plea-Sure of God, Sustaining the Soul and causing it to endure beyond the original nal capacity of its own nature; he adds expressly in the very next words, (as if he had foreseen and designed to prevent your Hypothesis,) that the reason why the Soul is subject to such endless Punishments, is because it was created originally immortal, and therefore

cannot die : For the Soul, fays the, cannot utterly perish and be extinguished, because it has its Original from the amex Dei Spiricu, qui est Spirit of God [he means will. that which you call the

.Acves

t Nam interire prorfus anima non potest; quoniæternus, originem cepit.

won, Gen. 2, 7, ] which is eternal. again; in Answer to that Objection. but the

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\*Si est immortalis Anima, quomodo patibilis inducitur & pænæ sentiens? lib. 7, 20.

† Ejus naturæ reddi animas, ut, si non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex
Deo sunt, tamen cruciabiles siant per corporis maculam, quæ peccatis inusta
sensum doloris attribuis,
ibid.

\* how that which is immortal, can be capable of suffering; he has these remarkable words: Mens
Souls, faith the, though
they are not capable of being
utterly extinguished, because
they are of Divine Original; yet by being immersed

in Sense, and depraved by Sin, they become liable to Misery and Torment. And
again: \*What wonder is
m sint immorrales anima.
it, saith he, if Soult, not.

cum sint immortales anima, it, saith he, if Souls, not tamen patibiles sint Deo? withstanding that they are ibid.

of having punishment inflitted upon them by God?

Most of these Passages, which are as remarkably sull and clear against you, as if the Author had written on purpose to oppose your Hypothesis, you inexcusably pass over without notice. And from these Passages any one may easily observe, how very grossy, thad almost said beyond Example, you mis represent those other places which you do cite from him. The Passages which you cite, pag. 70, wherein Lastanius affirms Immortality, not to be the necessary Condition of our Nature, but the Reward

Reward of our Virtue; are all plainly meant not of Perpetuity of Duration, (which he every where affirms to belong necessarily to our Nature,) but of the eternal indefectible Happiness of Heaven; which this Author always means by the Word Immortality, as alone deserving that glorious Title; notwithstanding that at the same time he expressly and constantly affirms the opposite State to be of equal duration and perpetuity. Thus when, speaking of that second Death,

which he says \* does not extinguish wicked Souls, but subjects them to endless misery, he says, that That likewise is of perpetual Dutation, as Immortality also is; 'tis evident that by

\*Cujus non ea vis est, ut imustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pænam, secundam mortem nominamus, quæ est & ipsa perpetua, sicut & immortalitas. lib. 2, 12.

Immortality he means to express, not Duration, but Happiness: And in the place which you cite to prove that he did not think Immortality natural to Men, he in express words declares that

by Immortality he means the unspeakable and eternal Happiness of Heaven: And when he says \* there would

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† Ne Immortalitatem delicate affequerentur ac molliter, sed ad illud aterna vita ineloquibile pramium lumma cum difficultate des.

\* Nam nihil interesset justum & injustum; siquidem omnis
homo natus, immorralis sieret. ibid.

E 4

+ lib. 7,

4 & 5.

be no difference betwixt just and unjust, no such thing as Reward and Punishment, if all Men were born Immortal; 'tis very evident from the Thread of his Discourse. that he means, if Men were born originally, and without undergoing any

\* Cum posset semper Spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare ficut Angelos genuit, quibus Immortalitas fine ullo malorum periculo ac metu constat, &c. ibid.

Tryal, into such a State, as \* the Good Angels are now in, and the Saints shall be in after the Resurrection, namely a State of Indefectible Virtue and Hap-

ing

piness; then the Nature of Rewards and Punishments would be taken away. Again; Those passages which you cite pag. 71, wherein you suppose that Laciantins by that immortal Spirit, which God put or inspired into an earthly Body, means, not the natural Soul of Man, but the Divine Spirit received in our Saviour's regenerating Baptism, as a new Principle of Immortality; These Passages, I say, if to any one that pleafes to compare the places, they do not appear to be + all and every one of 12. lib. 2, them clearly spoken on the contrary, 12. lib. 7 concerning that natural Soul, which God is said to have breathed into Man, Gen. 2. 7; it will not be easie to conceive how any Man can possibly express his mean-

ing in Words: And when from this Passage [Ficto corpore, spiravit ei animam de vitali fonte Spiritus sui, qui est perennis; ut si Anima superaverit, que ex Deo oritur, sit Immortalis & in perpetua luce versetur,] you infer that the Soul is Immortal, only conditionally, if it be victorious; your misrepresentation of the Passage, is very extraordinary: For the Words are not one entire Sentence, as any one would imagine them to be by your manner of citing them; but two Passages, at a Page distance from each other; And not Anima (as you feem to understand it) but Homo is the Nominative Case to sit immortalis & in perpetua Luce versetur; And so far is the Author from making the Souls Immortality conditional, by these Words; that directly on the contrary he in this very Sentence means to fay, that the Soul must of necessity be Immortal in all circumstances; only with this dif-

ference, that † if a Man lives after the Spirit, his Immortality shall be a Happy one; but if he live after the Flesh, his Immortality

† Ex rebus diversis ac repugnancibus Homo factus est; — ut si Anima superaverit, cuæ ex Deo oritur, sie immortalis & in perpetua luce versetur; siautem Cor-

pus vicerit, —— sit in tenebris sempiternis & in Morte. Cujus [mortis] non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in attenum, lib. 2, 12.

must

4 lib. 7,

4 & 5.

be no difference betwixt just and unjust, no such thing as Reward and Punishment, if all Men were born Immortal; 'tis very evident from the Thread of his Discourse, that he means, if Men were born originally, and without undergoing any

\* Cum posset semper Spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare ficut Angelos genuit, quibus Immortalitas fine ullo malorum periculo ac metu constat, &c. ibid.

Tryal, into such a State, as \* the Good Angels are now in, and the Saints shall be in after the Resurrection, namely a State of Indefectible Virtue and Hap-

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must

must be a miserable one: When therefore you say, that the way, according to Lactantius, taken by providence, for making Mans actual Mortality or Immortality the Reward or Punishment of his Free-will, was to joyn his Soul to his Body immediately, which being it self Frail and Mortal, could not secure the Soul from actual Mortality; and That this he supposes would make the Complex of the Soul and Body actually Mortal; You might with the fame Truth, and with as much appearance of Reason, have said, that Lattantius wrote his Book with a delign to disprove the whole Christian Religion, or any other particular Article of it whatsoever. Again, when Lastantius

\* Quia temporalem vieam temporalis mors fequitur, consequens est ut resurgant anima ad vitam perenpem, quia finem mors tem-

fays, that \* fince this temporal Life is succeeded by temporal Death, it follows that the Soul must rise again to poralis accepie, lib. 7, § 10. eternal Life, because temporal death has an End; it

is a very great and palpable misrepresentation, to infer from these words, (as you do, pag. 73,) that Lactantins was so far from owning the Immortality of the Soul, as Natural to it, that he seems to own its actual Death. Death, for the space between the Death of the Body and the Resurrection; and therefore astribes the Resurrection to the Soul as well as the Body: For what can be a groffer misrepresentation of any Author, than from one fingle Passage (even supposing that Passage not reconcilable with the rest,) to affirm that his Opinion was just contrary to what he largely and expressly almost in every Page of his Book declares it to be? But after all, this Passage is not difficult to be reconciled: For when he who fays a hundred times in his Book, that the Soul has no dependence on the Body, but subsists as well and better after it is separated from it, says in one single passage that Mens Souls do [resurgere rife again to eternal Life; can any thing be more evident than that his meaning is, that the Souls shall be + united again to entur. lib. 7. 23. rursus cartheir Bodies at the Resur- ne induentur ibid. 24. rection before the Judgment? It is an easy Figure, and very

usual in the best Authors, and in the Scripture it self, to signify by the word [Soul] the same as [Person] in general: Thus Gen. 46, 26; All the Souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, &c. And

Lev.

Lev. 5, 2, If a Soul touch any unclean thing, &c. In which places, nothing can be more absurd than to understand Soul in the strict and proper Sense of the Word: And yet there is just as much reason so to do, as, from the passage now cited, to conclude, that La-Ganting, contrary to what he expressly declares in almost every page of his Book, was of Opinion that the Soul died with the Body. Had not the World deservedly an Opinion of your great Learning, there would be no need to take notice of such extraordinary misconstructions: Which really, Sir, in your representation of this Author. appear to have proceeded from greater Prejudice, or greater Want of care, than Men of your known Abilities are ordinarily guilty of. At last you come off. pag. 75, with saying that Lactantius's Reasonings either prove or are consistent with a precarious Immortality; at least even by our modern Reasonings, do not imply any Necessity of an Immortality by Nature: And who, I beseech you, ever taught any other Immortality of the Soul, than a precarious one; that is, depending on the Pleasure of God Almighty? or who ever imagined, that any

any thing which was promise and had a beginning, was not also capable of being destroyed and having an end, if God should so please?

You begin with St Athanasius, (Sect. 21,) very ominously; Acknowledging that he does indeed own the Doctrine of the Souls Immortality, as a Doctrine of the Church: Which he does, not only in

\* the words you cite from him, but also largely and fully in many other places of his Oratio contra Gentes; stilling the Soul + rational and immortal; affirming that \* when it is Separated from the Body, it will have a much clearer knowledge of its own Immortality; and proving its Immortality distinctly, from several Topicks and Arguments: If the Soul, \* saith he, be distinct from the Body; as we have before Shown; And the Body is mortal; It follows necessarily, that the Soul, being distinct from the Body,

\* 'On है भे बे र्रायक्त कि प्रमण्डण में पित्रों, भे उहेर बेश्वप्रस्वां का संग्रेंश्वा के उसे क्रियम्बाद्य स्त्रीं के शिव्य क्रियेश्वाद. Orat. cont. Gent.

† Ti हैं थें ए सेंग मह नव नव-AIV, में प्रियों त्रिश्मा में वे जेवंval ; ibid.

\* Πῶς ἐχὶ μᾶκλον τὸ ποκλῶ πλέον, ἀπολυθεῖ σα το μαίω. — οαιρωτέρυν εξει τ τ αθωνασίας γνῶσιν; ibid.

\* Ει χο ἀλλιω ἀυτιω ὁ λόγ Ο ἀπέδειζε το σόμα το σώμα ουσό δυπτον ἀνάγκη τ ψογιώ εξ), πώ μιλ εξ) χτ το σώμα. Το bid.

must 100%

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must be immortal: And again; The Soul, saith \* he, therefore meditates and thinks upon things immortal and eternal, because it is itself. Immortal; For as the Body, being itself Mortal, has all its Senses employed about mortal things; so the Soul, whose Faculties

are employed about immortal things, must itself of necessity be Immortal and live for ever: These Arguments are plainly drawn from the Nature of the Soul itself, and are directly contrary to your Notion of an Immortalizing Spirit or Will of God: And accordingly, speaking of the Heathens, he expresses himself in the very same manner concerning Their Souls in particular; If they pretend to believe, saith

\* Ει ή ψυχιο άξιδον [ al. αυχδον] έχειν, κ) δτὶ τω λομκώ μέρα φερνδσιν, εἰκότως τῶτο ποιῦντες 
διατὶ, ώς μιὰ έχοντες ψυχὰν, 
α δει φερνεν φερνῶσι, κὶ ἐκ 
ποιῶσι; ψυχὰν κὸ αὐνατον 
έχεντες κὶ μιὰ βλεπομένιμι 
αυτοῖς, τ θεὸν ἐν τοῖς βλεπομένοις κὶ θνητοῖς ἀπεικάζεσιν. ibid.

Soul, and value themselves upon their Rational Faculties, as they justly may; why, as if they had no Soul, do they act contrary to Reason, and not think as they ought to do, but make God a Being meaner than themselves

selves? For, having themselves an Immortal and invisible Soul, yet they make God like to things visible and mortal. When therefore to Athanasius's general Affertion concerning the Immortality of the Soul, you answer, that That does not concern your Cause, because your Question is not whether the Soul be Immortal, but whether it be Immortal in its own Nature; you are guilty of a very great Fallacy: For if by the Souls being Immortal in its own Nature, you intend to express, what we mean, that the Soul by the Powers given it at its first Creation is naturally able to continue for ever; then Athanasius's Affertion does concern your Cause; because, in all the places now cited, he expressly maintains the natural Immortality of the Soul in that Sense: But if by Immortal in its own Nature, you mean necessarily Immortal, as God is; then neither Athanasius, nor we, nor perhaps any Body else ever meant that the Soul was Immortal in its own Nature.

From the Passages therefore now cited, wherein Athanasius so expressly and very largely asserts the natural Immortality of the Soul, 'tis very reasonable to conclude,

clude, that all those Passages in his Book de Incarnatione verbi Dei, which you understand to imply a natural Mortality of the Soul, ought (that they may not be inconsistent with what he so fully and expressly afferts elsewhere,) to be understood concerning that natural Mortality which is the Dissolution of the Body and Separation of the Soul, without determining what becomes of the Soul after that Separation. those Passages may the better be understood in that Sense, because they are all spoken concerning that Mortality Adam incurred by his Sin in Paradife; the Consequence of which Mortality, (with respect to the State of the Soul separated thereby from the Body,) antecedent to the Promise of Christ, was not a Question necessary to be entred into. And this is still the more confirmed by This, that even those Phrases, Зачати печтиотит Ф, фо обей паецинивонг, ст то тв Azváls obopa uiver, and the like; which feem at first fight to make the most for your purpose; 'tis plain need not be understood to express the total Extinction or utter Annhilation of Adam, if Christ had never been promised; but either his having no ground to expect any any Restoration to his former state by a Resurrection of the Body; which seems to be the meaning of them in some places; or else (which is evidently their Signification in some other places,) Death's continuing to prevail and extend it self over his Posterity: Thus, When

Adam had sinned, saith\*
he, Death entred into the World; and this Destrution prevailed more and more over the whole Race of Mankind. For Men encreased and multiplied their Sins beyond measure: And therefore Death prevailing more and more, and this Destruction continuing to have Dominion over Men, the whole Race of Mankind was lost.

\* TETE 3 HOWNE, of 2 aufpome anifernonov, i 3 क्री हे भेड़ा महिए मंदर वंगार्केश ηκμασέν. Η πλώου ? χτι σύστο ιχύεσα καθ' όλε ? भींदर — में भी में दे क्रीह πλημμελήμασιν όι ανθρωποι κα άχεις όρων ω εισκέων ניקאת מוצו מאמ אמד סאו-200 ETTER AVORDED , ACITTÉ x es auctor ex: Au Saos .---בום. או דמו דם האהיסיד שם-हवेंड नवं हवायोगहराड रूम की वंगθρώπων, το μ τη ανθρώπων % ⊕ éodeipero. De Incar. nat. Verbi.

The same thing (namely that the Phrases before-mentioned do not signific the total extinction of Adam, both Soul and Body, if Christ had never been promised; but only That Mortality, which is the dissolution of the Body and separation of the Soul;) may also be gathered from those other Expressions of the same Author in his Book

de Incarnatione Christi, from some of which you very unreasonably endeavour (pag. 85,) to conclude the direct contrary. For when he speaks of the Souls being held [in sequis,] in Bonds, and [in sequis, savare] in the Bonds of Death; itis plain this does not signific the Extinction of the Soul, but its Confinement to ['Asm,] the separate State. And therefore, speaking of Christ's delivering Men from that Mortality which was the Confequence of Adam's Sin, he saith;

\* Διὰ τῦτο κὶ ὅπε διεφθαρη το τὰ ἀνθρωπε σῶμα,
ἐμειωσείε) Ἰησες τὸ ἴδιον
σῶμα κὶ ὅπε κεκράτητο ἡ
ὑκὰ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἐν θανάτω, ἐμεῖ ἐπιδείκνυ) ὁ
Χριςὰς τὰ ἀνθρωπίνω ψυχω ἰδίαν ἔσαν, &c. De
Incarn. Christi contra Apollinar. lib. I.

\* To that place where the Body of Man was corrupted, thither did the Body of Christ go; and to that Place, where the Soul of Man was detained in Death, thither did Christ go with his Humane Soul, &c. In which Passage 'tis evi-

dent, that by the Words [κεκεφτητο ή ψυχή ή 'Ανθρωπίνη εν Θανάτω] the Soul of Man was detained in Death, is not meant the Extinction of the Soul, but its Confinement to ['Adns] that separate State, to which the Soul of Christ descended. And in that very Passage, where from the Souls being concerned in the Sentence [Θανάτω δποδείη] thou shalt Shalt Surely dye, you would infer the Extinction of the Soul; if you had cited the Words at length, it would have appeared that just the contrary was intended: The Words are these; God,

saith + he, passed upon Man a double Sentence of Punishment; Saying to his earthly Body, Dust thou art, and unto Dust shalt thou return; and so the Body turned unto Corruption; And to his Soul, Thou shalt surely die; and so the Man was separa-

+ בות אחני ל דון שפומן ד υπό çασιν δέ δωκε τώ μ γπίνω εipnκώς, Γiì ei, kj eis I no drendion is sous voc-A 26) p. Doed To owna, Secrots Stornvaules. Th 3 Luxi, Savary Sto Savii ng π છ , κὸ ἐν δυσὶ τόποις ὁι-χεως καταδικάζε). ibid:

ted, and condemned to depart into two dif. ferent places: From the last of which Words it is very evident, that by applying that Threatning [ Javary awo-Down ] thou shalt surely dye, to the Soul; he did not mean its Extinction, but its Separation and Confinement to [ Advs ]

the separate State.

Your last citation out of this Author, \* Tas, et (pag. 86,) is very remarkable. A- σαφαική ή שעות אמשי gainst certain Hereticks who taught that was, & the Soul was corporeal, he argues from ownerious those Words of our Saviour, Fear το σώμαπ not them that kill the Body, but cannot ρε); πῶς kill the Soul. If, saith \* he, the Soul τὰς τὰς en a su nagezoudous suzas, συδίματα δνομάσας, &c. De adventu bristi contra Apollinar. lib. 2.

be, as you Appollinarists contend, corporeal: why cannot it be killed and perish with the Body? and why doth St Peter, speaking of Separate Souls, call them Spirits? Here, you say, the [oupment toxin] fleshly or corporeal Soul, is plainly opposed to the [wish matinin] Spiritual Soul, and for that reason is supposed as capable of being killed by Men, as the Body it self. Is not this very extraordinary? when the plain and express meaning of Athanasius, is to show that there can be no fuch thing at all as [oapuni fuzi] a fleshly or corporeal Soul; because, if there was, it would be capable of being killed, which our Saviour fays cannot be.

All that you say, Sect. 23, seems to be utterly Unintelligible: And those words in particular, pag. 91, (which I have before had an occasion to take notice of,) where you suppose the Soul to be Something distinct both from Spirit, and also from Matter and Motion; that is to say, a Material Form; an active Substantial Principle, distinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter in esse, in sieri, in operari, and which must accordingly be dissolved on the dissolution of

of that Matter on which it depends: These words, I say, appear so very absurd and contradictory in themselves, that no Consutation of them can be stronger than the bare transcribing them.

You seem very certain, Sect 24, that your Doctrine can have no ill influence upon Mens present Practise; because, though you affert indeed the natural Mortality of the Soul, yet you teach at the same time, that the Souls of all those, who hear of the Gospel, whether they imbrace it or no, shall be actually immortalized; and so bad Men can take no advantage of the Doctrine concerning the Natural Mortality of the Soul, to encourage themselves in their Wickedness with the Hopes of Impunity. But can you really think, Sir, that it is a thing of no ill consequence in Practise, to raise new disputes, to fill the Minds of weak and unstable Men with endless doubts and Scruples, and the mouths of the profane with new Topicks of Scepticism and Raillery, against the most important and fundamental Doctrines of all Religion? Or can you be indeed perswaded,

swaded, that such Men as are pleased. with some of your Notions, will as readily admit all the rest also? You are forced to make a new and distinct Hypothesis upon every particular occasion: You first suppose the soul of Man naturally Mortal; and then, to secure to good Men the Unchangeable State of Heaven, you are forced to suppose their Souls præternaturally immortalized to Happiness by the Divine Spirit: Yet, because all who receive that Divine Spirit, do not so behave themselves as to be † Pramon. capable of the Happiness of Heaven, you are forced (though † unwillingly) with your to suppose some of them immortalized by the same Divine Spirit to Punishment: And after this, least those who reject the Gospel and never receive the Divine immortalizing Spirit at all, should take advantage of the Souls natural Mortality to encourage themselves with hopes of Impunity in their Wickedness, you are forced to suppose Their Souls made immortal without any immortalizing Principle at all, by the mere Omnipotence and Arbitrary Pleafure of God. Now, all these Hypotheses appearing very precarious and independent on each other; is it not very obvious to perceive, that profane Men

pag. 21, compared Discourse pag. 8 & 31.

Men will very gladly and with great advantage make use of all your Arguments for the natural Mortality of the Soul; and drop the following parts of your Hypothesis? And indeed I cannot see, but you must in some measure be answerable for this ill Consequence. For it is not enough to prevent the natural and obvious ill consequences of an Hypothesis, that a Learned and ingenious Man is able to invent such further Suppositions, and to find out such Shifts and Distinctions, by which he shall think he can evade the force of those Consequences. There is hardly any Opinion so extravagant or of so mischievous consequence, but an ingenious Man may maintain it in such manner, as that upon his whole Hypothesis it shall not be easy to charge him with any ill consequence, for which he will not be able to find some evasion: And yet he that maintains it, must nevertheless be answerable for such ill Consequences, as are naturally apt to follow from the Opinion it self, without the additional Hypothesis which are made use of to salve it. The Epicureans, who taught that Pleasure was the chief Good, when they were charged with F 4

with the obvious ill Consequences of that Doctrine, were provided to make such ingenious Explications of it, that they thought themselves abundantly able to evade all those ill Consequences that could be drawn from it: Yet that Doctrine was evidently a very pernicious Doctrine; and they who maintained it, could not be excused (as Cicero has largely shown) from being answerable for those Consequences, which

† Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget: Il-lud quæro, quid ei consentaneum sit dicere, qui &c. Cicero.

were but † too naturally drawn from it by the generality of Men, who would not attend to the Subtilties and Distinctions

of those Philosophers. He that will suppose Men to have no Souls at all, but that their Life is entirely extinguished at the Dissolution of the Body; and at the same time supposes that at the Resurrection their Life shall be restored again, and continue for ever; will be sure to pretend that no ill Consequence can be drawn from his Doctrine, because he supposes Men actually and in event as much Immortal, as if they had Souls really distinct from their Bodies: And yet I believe you your self make no doubt but That Opinion is a very

pernicious one. He that will affirm that there is no other Substance in the World but Matter; and at the same time supposes Matter capable of all the same Powers and Attributes, which we ascribe to Spirit; may likewise with the same reason pretend, that no ill Consequence can be drawn from his Opinion: And yet no Body can doubt but such an Opinion leads directly to Atheism. not therefore so very clear, as you seem to suppose it to be, that none of those Consequences are to be charged upon you, which (if your whole Hypothesis be granted) you can find indeed a way of evading.

You attempt to prove (Sect 25) that the Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no Ingredient in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themselves; by saying, that the popular Heathens believed only their first Ancestors to have been Gods, their next to have been Heroes or Demi-Gods, and the later generations to have been pure Men; Unless the Supreme Being were pleased (even in the degenerous Ages) to confer the nobler Principle on some choice Favourites. Here you seem to forget, that the popular Heathens (as you call them) had all

a Notion of Elyfian Fields and of a Tartarus, that is, of a Place of future Happiness or Misery, where the Souls of those which you call pure or mere Men were to be disposed of, either to continue there for ever, or to come out upon new revolutions, but not to be extinguished. Yet presently after, (pag. 96) you say that, by the oldest Tradition, all Souls were supposed to have the Divine Principle connatural to them; And the rest of the Section is wholly fpent in explaining the Notions of those whom you call (pag. 100) the Tradi-tional travelling Philosophers, who believed that Human Souls underwent many Purgations and different Revolutions, but that no part of the divine feed might perish finally; and that all Humane Souls were thus far at least of a divine extraction, not as the Notion of Divine might intitle them to infinite Perfection, but as it might at least intitle them to Immortality: All which is so far from being any thing to your purpose, of proving that the Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no ingredient in the Nature of the Human Sout among the Heathens themselves; that on the contrary it feems to me to prove rather directly against you.

Sect. 26, You all along confound either necessary Immortality, or else the Notion of Præ-existence and Revolutions of Souls, with natural Immortality. That which any of the Primitive Christians blamed Plato and Origen for, was not their afferting the Immortality of the Soul, but its Præ-existence and everlasting Revolutions. Their Maxim. that whatever had a Beginning, must therefore be capable likewise of having an End, does not at all prove against natural, but only against necessary Immortality, that is, necessary and independent Existence: As is evident from what you your self observe, that upon this Principle they owned none Immortal but God himself; No, not the Angels; And that the Apostle affirms of God, ['O μον & χων αθανασίαν, I Tim. 6, 16,] that He only has Imortality, as being the auroa Javasia from whom All that will pretend to Immortality, must derive it, and not from their own Nature; that is, not from the Necessity of their own Nature, but from the Will of God, who was pleased to create them Immortal, and upon whom (notwithstanding their Immortality, that is, notwithstanding their natural Power of continuing for ever, mon. pag.

ever, without being liable to be destroyed by any created Force,) they nevertheless continually depend for their Preservation.

Aristotle, by affirming the immortal Soul to be [auraber] from without, means plainly that it is Something distinct from the Body, and not (as you interpret him pag. 101,) that it is not ingredient in the Constitution of Mankind in general, or (as you it elsewhere express your self) that it is a praternatural Principle; as if, naturally, Men had no rational

Discours. 1. Souls at all.

The other Maxim you mention, That nothing that is passible can be Immortal, proves likewise only against necessary, not against natural Immortality. For a thing's being capable to be acted upon, does not at all prove that it is capable of being destroyed by any natural Power. Every perfectly solid Particle of Matter it self, is incapable of being destroyed or even divided by any Power of Nature, though it is as capable of being moved and agitated and acted upon, as any compound Body. The Soul may in like manner be very capable of fuffering, and of being acted upon; and yet it will not at all follow, that it

natural Power. Those of the Antients, who proved that the Soul of the rich Man in the Parable, must have been Corruptible, because it suffered Torment; you acknowledge prove at the same time that it must likewise have been Corporeal: But the Corporality of the Soul, you know, was taught only by one or two Men. The rest were all of a different Opinion. And Lastantius is very particular and expressin answering that

Objection; † If the Soul
be immortal, how then is it
passible and capable of enduring Punishment? and if ens? lib. 7, \$ 20.
it be capable of pain, how is it not capable

of Dissolution? The Answer he gives, is; first, \* that (according to the Notion of the \*Ejus naturæ reddi animas, ut si non extinguibiles

Stoicks) the Souls of Men, though by reason of their Dinine Original they can-

Divine Original they cannot indeed be extinguished,

yet by being immersed in Sense and depraved by Sin, they may become liable to tam esse

Misery and Punishment: Secondly, † Dei potestrain incorporalia comprehendar, &, quemadmodum voluerit,

afficiat. Nam & Angeli Deum metuunt, & Quid ergo mirum, fi cum sint immortales anima, tamen patibiles sint Deo? ibid. §

in totum, quoniam ex Deo

funt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam,

&c. ibid.

Immaterial Things can be acted upon, yet God has as much Power over them, as over corporeal things: And lastly,

\* Sed tamen docent nos fanctæ literæ, quemadmodum pænas impii fint laturi. Nam quia peccata in corpo ribus contraxerunt, rurfus carne induentur, ut in corporibus piaculum folvant. ibid.

\* that in order to endure Punishment, the Souls shall again be united to their Bodies. All which passages undeniably show that Lastantius did not think the Soul naturally corruptible, and

preserved præternaturally by the Power of God; but, on the contrary, that the Soul was naturally Immortal, but by the Power of God made capable of enduring Punishment.

If there was any strength in the Argument you make use of, Sect. 27; that because the actual Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the Gospel, therefore it is not capable of being proved by Reason from the Nature of the Soul itself; It would follow by the same argument, that Moral Obligations, because they are Revelations of the Will of God in the Gospel, therefore are not capable of being proved by Reason, from the Nature of God, of Men, and of Things. Some things revealed in the Gospel,

are indeed of such a Nature, that they could not have been known at all without Revelation: But Others (of which the Immortality of the Soul is one,) are fuch as were capable of being in great measure discovered by the Light of Nature and right reason; but yet by the Revelation of the Gospel, are made known with much greater Certainty, greater Clearness, greater Authority, and in a Manner much better fitted to all Capacities. This seems to be the proper meaning of the word [pwricav] 2 Tim. I, 10, ] has brought to Light, has clearly discovered, has universally and evidently made known, that which before was but obscurely, and difficultly, and imperfectly understood. The Allusion you suppose to be between the words, [bas brought Life and Immortality to Light through the Gospel, and those other words of the Apostle, an Inheritance incorruptible, that fadeth not away, of the Saints in Light, is indeed some little Similitude of Words; the word Light being used in both places; but not the least Allusion or Similitude in Sense. And indeed you feem your felf to be conscious of the weakness of your Argument in this whole

whole Matter; by your saying that †pag. 106. the Immortality of the Soul, at least † in Heaven, is plainly supposed not to be known without divine Revelation; \*pag. 104. and again, At least \* as to the giving us that immortal Life in Heaven; and, That the Immortality of the Soul could not have been otherwise known to the Practise which Religion expects in consequence of it; and again, That it could \*pag. 104. not have been known, at least \* with that Assurance which was requisite for the Practise which Religion requires pursuant to the Belief of it.

That the Sadducees (Sect. 28,) denied the Immortality of the Soul, is very true; But then it is worth observing, that the same Men asserted also that there was no Resurrection, neither Angel nor Spirit, Acts 23, 6. Your interpretation of which words, is very extraordinary. What is the meaning of Spirit here, as it is joyned with Angel, you say is manifest: It is that Immortalizing Spirit which makes us 'Ioayyéans, that is, Immortal and entitled to Heaven, as well as the Angels are: That same Spirit indeed, by which the Angels them-selves

This therefore oblig'd them [the Sadducees] to deny the actual immortalizing of either Angels or Humane Souls, when they denied them Both that Spirit which could alone immortalize them. These Words, I think, need no Reflexion to be made upon them.

Your Interpretation (Sect. 31,) of that Text, I Cor. 15, 22, As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive; seems very forced and unnatural. You understand it to signifie, that as All who descended from Adam, must die; so All who are in Christ. that is, all Christians, shall be made alive. But this Interpretation, if it was true, would prove too much for you; namely, that those only who embraced, not those who rejected the Gospel, should be raised again: And the general tenor of Scripture, which every where declares that Unbelievers, who never were in Christ, shall be raised to Condemnation; shows plainly that your Interpretation of this Text is wrong. And how the false Notion certain Hereticks had of a metaphorical Resurrection, 2 Tim. 2, 18, tends

to prove that St Pauls true account of the literal Resurrection, is to be understood in a particular and limited Sense;

is not easie to conceive.

Your inference in the same place, against the Universality of the Resurrection, from what the Apostle says concerning Baptism; seems likewise wholly precarious. For the Apostle does not in this Chapter say any thing, by which he might feem to ground the Resurrection upon Baptism: But only, arguing against those who pretended to be Christians, and yet did not believe the Resurrection of the Dead, he shows how abfurd it was for such Persons to be baptized, and thereby to expose themselves to such hazards as they must unavoidably do by their professing Christianity, if they had no expectation of a Refurrection from the Dead. Whatever be the meaning of that difficult Phrase, of being baptized for the Dead; the stress of the Argument plainly lies upon these Words, And why stand we in Jeopardy every Hour? That Baptism, whatever it was, expofed them to some hazard, and gave occasion to their being persecuted; and the Apostles argument is, that it was foolish

foolish for them to expose themselves to such danger needlesly and to no purpose, if there was to be no such thing as a Resurrection from the Dead. The Apostle grounds the reasonableness of being baptized, and of embracing Christianity, which was a persecuted Religion; purely upon the hopes of a Resurrection from the Dead: But he does not at all ground the Resurrection upon Baptism, nor says any thing which does in the least insinuate that the Resurrection should not be universal.

The Conclusion you draw (Sect. 32,) from what St Paul teaches, Rom. 5, is very obscure. The Summ of the Apostles Doctrine there, is, that That Condemnation which was brought uponMen by Adam, they are delivered from by Christ. How you can infer any thing from thence, against the universal Immortality of the Soul, I do not perceive. You suppose that those over whom Death reigned between the Times of Adam and Moses, were extinguished by a total Mortality both of Soul and Body; But the Death there spoken of, is plainly the same Death to which all other G 2

ther Men likewise are subject; For 'tis not said, that Death reigned over Them only; but that Death reigned even over them also, as well as over the rest of Mankind; notwithstanding that they had not sinned against any positive Law. as Adam before, and those who lived under the Law did after; but were subject to Death, only as it was a natural Consequence of Adam's Transgression: To infer from hence, that their Souls as well as Bodies, were subject to that Mortality, is begging the Question which was undertaken to be proved. Those who are subject to Death, in consequence of Adam's Transgression, are indeed stiled Many, ver. 15 and 19; as those to whom the Benefit of Christ's Death redounds, are also in the same place stiled Many: But those Mamy who die thro' the Offence of One, are, ver. 12 and 18, express valled All Men; and there is no good reason to suppose, but that the Death of Christ, who was promised immediately upon the Fall of Adam, may conditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit, under different Dispensations, to All Men likewise. To say that the Dominion of Death, signifies in this place something

thing peculiar, under which all Men are not included; because the Apostle affirms that Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's Transgressions; is very singular and groundless: For the Dominion of Death is not there confined (as you suppose it) to the space between Adam and Moses; so as to fignifie a particular kind of Death prevailing at that Time, an extinction of Soul as well as dissolution of the Body; But the Apostles affertion is plainly This, that in Consequence of Adam's Transgression, Death (in the common acceptation of Mortality) reigned in that space of time also, even over them that had not transgressed any positive Law after the similitude of Adam's Transgression, as well as over those who had in their own Persons disobeyed positive Laws. From whence how any thing can be collected to your purpose, is very difficult to imagine.

Whether that Text, Job. 1. 9, That was the true Light, which lighteh every Man that cometh into the World; was ever alleged by Any, to prove that an Immortalizing Spirit is given to every Particular

ticular by Christ himself; I cannot tell. But I think your Interpretation of it, (Sect. 33,) is utterly unintelligible. The † pag. 136. Avon, you † say, is That which our Apostle here makes in all Men, [in every Man that cometh into the World, inlightned by the Visitation of the Aby , as an external Principle: Yet so as not to make any change in the Nature, in the Person so inlightned, without peculiar divine Favour, and dispositions in the recipient, for such an Union with the Nove, as may qualify it for the divine Favour of raising it above its own Nature: Till then, they are separable again, and this external Visitation of the Novo, leaves the visited Luxi as Mortal as it found it, where there is no particular design of God for immortalizing it to Punishment. What the meaning of this, and all that follows in that Section, is; and how you collect it from the fore-cited Text of St John; is not, I believe, possible to be understood.

When St Paul says, I Thess. 4, 16, that the dead in Christ shall rise first; These words do not indeed prove that there must afterwards be a resurrection of them that never heard of Christ; because

because the dead in Christ, which are here said to rise first, are not, 'tis true, opposed in this place to the dead out of Christ, but to them that shall be found alive in Christ at the time of the judgment: (Where note by the by, that you + misinterpret this Text, by oppo- + pag 141. fing the dead in Christ, and which are said to rise first, not, as the Apostle does, to them that shall be found alive in Christ, but to those who had been formerly in Christ and did not die in him. or to those who might have been in him if they had pleased, but never were in him actually.) But other places of Scripture, as has been before shown, do sufficiently prove the Universality of the Refurrection: And particularly that parallel Text, 1 Cor. 15, 23; where the fame Apostle says, that every Man shall be raised in his own Order; Christ the First-fruits, afterwards they that are Christs at his coming; And then cometh the end &c. Which words being immediately subjoyned to that universal declaration, As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive; cannot, without great force, be interpreted to any other Sense, but that the End must fignifie the general Resurrection of 211 G 4

all the dead. See Rev. 20, v. 5,12 & 13.

Your Interpretation (Sect. 35) of that Text, Rom. 2, 12, As many as have sinned without Law, shall also perish without Law, and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by the Law; is not only groundless; the word [anoviva shall perish] which you understand to signific Annihilation or bare ceasing to be, being evidently Synonymous to [xpi 3no : vrai shall be judged ;] But also (as I before observed upon your Premonition, Sect 6,) you thereby overthrow all the Threatnings of the Gospel, which frequently express the Punishment even of the worst of Sinners by that same word [ 270) EVTAL shall perish ] which you here interpret to fignify only a bare ceasing to be. You are your self sensible of this difficulty, pag. 143; where you confess, that though the word, Perish, may bear that milder Sense of only ceasing to be, yet it is also used in the Scriptures, concerning them whom all must believe liable to the severest positive Institions. You seem indeed sensible, I say, of this difficulty upon your Interpretation: But yet you give no answer to it conly you say, pag.

pag. 144, that though the word will indeed bear a larger Signification, yet in this place Annihilation may perhaps be more natural. Is not this a very fingular manner of arguing? To † collect † See Prantom the fignification of the word mon. pag. and, that those of whom it is here spoken, shall only cease to be; and yet at the same time to confess that in other places of Scripture That word has no such fignification; only, in this place, Annihilation may, perhaps, be more natural.

Your Interptetation of those other words of the Apostle, that when the Gentiles which have not the Law do by nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves; is no less extraordinary; Namely, that the Gentiles being a Law unto themselves, does not fignify their Obligation to obey the Law of nature, with respect to future rewards and Punishments; but only their \* owning the Reasonableness of the things \* pag. 144. imposed as a Law by God on the Jews, but not on themselves; which would no further oblige Them to the Observation of them, than as their own Interests might prevail with them to observe them, as they

would avoid the Punishments and obtain the Rewards of Providence in This Life. Is not this very wonderful; that the Gentiles should be able to judge of the Reasonableness of Gods moral Law to the Jews, and yet not be sensible that the Reasonableness of the Thing laid a strong Obligation upon themselves also? Or that they should be sensible of an Obligation laid upon them to live virtuously (which it would sometimes happen they could not do without exposing even their Life itself,) and yet not have any ground to expect a future Judgment, nor any other Rewards and Punishments than in the present Life? Is not this, destroying the very Nature of Virtue and Vice; and contrary to some of your own arguments, Sect. 47, and elsewhere?

It is not a very confishent Notion, to suppose as you do, (Sect. 35, 36, and elsewhere.) that the Souls of Men, though naturally mortal, yet are neither dissolved with their Bodies, nor yet perish afterwards by any natural Decay; but survive, and continue to subsiste in a separate State; and none of them ever perish actually by that decay

cay and Mortality which you suppose natural to Them; but that those who shall neither be immortalized to Happiness nor to Punishment, shall yet subfift till the general Judgment, and then be dissolved by that exquisite fire which is to prevail in the last Conflagration, at least so far as to deprive them of any sensibility of Pain. Is not this Notion more properly a supposing them to be naturally Immortal, that is, capable of subfisting for ever by the Powers given them at their original Production; but that God, by the interpolition of his Almighty Power, præternaturally destroys at the last day, such of them as are neither capable of eternal Happiness, nor yet deserve eternal Punishment? This certainly would have been rather the more confistent Scheme of the two. and somewhat a more defensible Explication of your Notion, (with respect to the bare Reason of the Thing,) than to affirm that all Souls are naturally mortal, and yet that none of them ever die by a natural decay and Mortality. But your Hypothesis, however va ried, would not yet have been truly confistent. For why, I befeech you, must it needs be supposed, that God cannot cannot dispose of all his rational Creatures into States suitable to their several Natures, and proportionable to their several capacities and deserts, without destroying and taking away their Being? And what can be more forced and disagreeable to Reason, than to suppose that the Sodomites and Ninevites and other Heathens of all Sorts, must indeed all appear at the Day of Judgment, but yet that their appearance there will be \* with no design of

rance there will be \* with no design of concerning them in the Judgment of the Day, but only in the retrospective part of the day, for vindicating the Divine Pro-

vidence, in relation to what had been transacted by it formerly? You imagine

tians and other wicked Men to whom the Gospel was never preached, may endure the Sufferings of the suture eternal State, during the time of their Duration;

\*pag. 311. to the day of Judgment; And that \*
the Infelicities good Heathens may have
Suffered in this Life, may be Suffi-

ciently rewarded by the Happiness of the intermediate space between their Death and the Judgment, though they have no share in those Eternal Rewards

which

ment: But, upon your Scheme, how can this be applied to those who shall live at the End of the World, when there may be as good and as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were in any other Age, and yet these, according to your notion, must All perish together at the Conslagration? And besides, because I presume you will not be less moved by Authority than by Reason; is not This extremely like one of those very Notions, which Tertullian, whose Authority you are otherwise so very desirous to make use of,

blames the \* Stoicks for, and ridicules them as vainly and \* needlesly imagining, that the Souls of their Disciples should continue capable of Instruction and Improvement in the separate State, when at the same time they believed they were all to perish in the approaching Constagration?

one perituris? Tertull. de Anima.

\* Qui animæ aliquod tempus indulgent, ab excessu usq; in conflagrationem universitatis, ut Stoici, &c. Tertull. de Anima.

Thu j Juxin Auralis f i) phaplin. Ex curis j ? ownal & andmar estat phapent and bruhier mas Roves rad' éaullui. F it The auralian, next f eis mis andiores the mantar &c. Numenius apud Enseb.

\*Quis autem illis poftumæ Cruditionis ufus ac fructus, jamjam conflaguati-

What

What you advance in your 41st and following Sections, concerning the State and Condition of Separate Souls, is in every respect too uncertain to have any thing built upon it. Whether they who never heard of the Gospel in This Life, shall hereafter have any new Offer made to them, and undergo any new Trial; or whether all Mankind, even those who never hear of Christ at all, shall however, by virtue of the original Promise of the Messiah made to Adam, have so much benefit of the redemption purchased by the Blood of Christ, as that at the general Judgment they shall all in some Proportions, and according to their several Capacities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy of the Gospelcovenant; (Which, seems, of the two, to be much the more probable Opinion: For how shall they who are found alive at the end of the World, undergo any new Trial?) Which-soever, I say, of these ways be true, it makes little difference as to the main Question. That, upon the whole, God is no respecter of Persons; and

and that our Saviour could not confine his design, as a Saviour of Souls, to any particular people, (as you prove largely and well in your 47th Section,) but will certainly in some manner or other extend the Offer of his gracious Covenant, or at least the Benefit and Equity of it in some Proportions, to Men of all Ages and Nations in the World; must undoubtedly be allowed by all confidering Persons: And this very confideration alone, if you had not at other times reasoned inconsistently with your self, might easily have saved you the whole trouble of inventing your wonderful Hypothesis concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul, in order to dispose of those Gentiles who never beard of Christ: But then as to the particular Manner, how the Equity and Mercy of the Gospel shall be extended to those to whom it never was preached; this, there is no Necessity of de. termining; And certainly your Notion, (Sect. 42,) concerning separate Souls being of necessity to be baptized with Water, even in the Literal Sense, in order to be made capable of any Favour Favour of this kind; might very well have been spared.

As to what you teach in the 48th and following Sections, concerning two distinct Souls in Men; Many antient Writers do indeed so express themselves, as if they supposed the sensitive Soul to be one Substance and the rational Soul another: But both That Philosophy it felf, and your explication of it particularly, is very unintelligible: And your Interpretation of that Text, where the Formation of Man is described, is really ridiculous; The Words are these; And the Lord God formed Man of the Dust of the Ground, and breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul, Gen. 2, 7. Upon this Text, you f say; Here is a Man supposed before the Divine Breathing; Certainly not a dead Man, which is indeed no Man, but a Man animated with that lower Soul, which is common to him and Beasts, and therefore cannot be imputed to a Divine Breathing. thing be more abfurd than this Interpretation? or can any thing be more plain,

† pag. 216.

plain, than that the meaning of these Words is, that God first formed the Body of Man out of the Dust, and then Inspired into it a living Soul? But which way soever the Philosophy of this Question be determined, it will still be nothing to your purpose: For suppose, if you please, that the Sensitive and Rational Soul be really two distinct Substances; yet how does this tend to prove that the Rational Soul is ever the more naturally Mortal? Did not those antient Philosophers, who thought Man composed of three distinct parts, a Body, a sensitive Soul, and a rational Spirit; teach that the rational Spirit was naturally Immortal? as you your + pag. 22. self confess + concerning Plato and 6 23. Philo; and you bring no Authority nor Reasoning, in these Sections, to the contrary.

In like manner your long Excursion, in the 55th Section, concerning the Separate State, does not at all prove, nor indeed so much as suppose, that the Soul is naturally Mortal: On the contrary, the Authorities you there cite, do all suppose it Immortal. Wherefore the particular groundless, H

not to say absurd Notions, which you there advance, concerning the Habitations of Separate Souls, and the Extent of the Power of Evil Spirits over them, &c; not being of any Importance with respect to the main Question; need not here be examined.

The Argument you propose, (Sect. 60,) that a naturally mortal Soul is more suitable and agreeable to be joyned with a naturally mortal Body, as a constituent of Human Nature, than a Soul that is naturally Immortal. This Argument, if it proved any thing, would prove that the Soul ought to be of the same Nature and Duration with the Body, and that it ought to die at the same time with the Body. that is, that there ought to be no Soul at all. For it is just as much disagreeable and unsuitable to the Body, to have such a Substance uni-ted to it, as is capable of subsisting at all after the Dissolution of the Body; as to have fuch a Substance united to it, as is capable of con-tinuing to subsist for ever. Since therefore you your self acknowledge that that the Soul is naturally able to subsist separate for many Ages; after the dissolution of the Body; this Argument, if it had any strength in it, would prove a great deal too much for you; and be of the same force against your own Notion of the Soul, as against ours; Unless you could perswade the World to believe, that not only the Immortalizing Spirit, but even the rational Soul, that Soul which you suppose to be naturally Mortal, is itself also a praternatural Principle, (as you \* Pranone or twice very absurdly affert,) 24. and and not originally a constituent Part of Discours. P. Human Nature.

Neither has the Argument you draw from the Doctrine of Original Sin, any greater strength in it. For there is no necessity of supposing, upon any Scheme, that such Persons as have no actual Sin of their own, shall ever be condemned to eternal Torments merely for the Sin of our first Parent. Tis true we cannot peremptorily assirm in particular, how God will dispose of such Souls, as having no actual Sins of their

their own to answer for, yet have no express Title, by the ordinary Means, to the Rewards of the Gospel: But certainly it a very weak and poor Argument, to conclude that numberless Souls must therefore necessarily be annihilated, merely because we do not know in particular, what State and Condition it will please God to assign them.

The same may be said of your Argument drawn from the Doctrine of Reprobation. You answer it your felf, by supposing that the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation is not the Doctrine of Scripture. And as to that Praterition, which is barely the not affording all Men the same Means of Knowledge; 'tis answered in your own Scheme, by what you say (Sect. 45, 46, and 47) concerning the new Trial some Persons may undergo in another State; and 'tis answered better, by suppofing that all Men may however be judged in proportion, according to the Equity of the Gospel, though they never had any explicit Knowledge of it.

Lastly, As to your Argument drawn from the Difficulty of reconciling eternal Punishments with the Goodness of God; That Difficulty does not arise chiefly from the difference of the Persons, who may be concerned in those Punishments proportionably in different degrees; but the real difficulty of the Question lies in this, how it is reconcileable with the Goodness of God, to put any Persons at all upon a necessity of making such an Option, wherein if they choose amis, the Misery they incur must be irrecoverable. And this difficulty is evidently much better answered, by supposing the Souls of Men to be naturally immortal; so that they who render themselves uncapable of Happiness, must consequently fall into remediless Mifery; than it can be answered in your Scheme, where none can be liable to endless Punishment, without being miraculously immortalized on purpose, by the Arbitrary Will and Power of God, beyond the origi-nal Capacity of their Nature.

And now, Sir, I cannot but earnestly recommend it again to your most serious consideration; whether the new and inconsiderate Notions you have advanced, and (the Arguments I will not say, because I think you have not offered any that are of any real force, but) the Pretenses of Reason and Authority, which you have put into the Hands of sceptical and profane Men, to confirm them in their prejudices against the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul; are not likely to be of great differvice to Religion; And whether you ought not (as all good Men are of Opinion you ought) to think of some means of making satisfaction to the Church, to whom you have given so great Offence; and of preventing the effect of that incouragement, which your Notions in this matter (tho' no Body doubts but it is contrary to your intention) have given to Immorality and contempt of Religion.

If zeal for the defense of a Doctrine of such importance, has in any part of this Letter caused me to drop any Expressions, which may be thought too

too sharp, and to carry in them too little of that respect, which all the World acknowledges to be justly due to you upon account of your very great Learning; I know you will pardon it upon such an occasion as this; and I cannot doubt but upon second Thoughts, you will be somewhat distatisfied with your self, for having published a Book, at which all good Men are forry, and all profane Men rejoyce.

#### FINIS.

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